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Whose recovery? IFI prescriptions for post-war states  
In this article we argue that a feminist political economy (FPE) approach is 
critical in understanding why standard policy prescriptions for post-war 
economic recovery fail to support the building of sustainably peaceful 
countries and secure lives for their citizens. Whilst many scholars criticise 
the IFIs’ policies in war-affected countries, our FPE approach provides 
two overlooked but crucial insights. First, it reveals the disjunction 
(indeed, chasm) between a country’s economic recovery from war and the 
IFI’s focus on the recovery of the economic system. Second, it locates the 
conceptual underpinnings of this chasm in the profoundly gendered 
assumptions of neoclassical economics. That is, we find the IFIs’ failure to 
prioritize financing the social infrastructure that could repair war’s 
damages, enhance human security, and support the ecosystems on which 
human security depends has its roots in the fundamental misconception of 
human reproductive, caring and subsistence labour, and of nature, as 
external to the economy rather than as central to the ability of the formal 
economy to function. We illustrate these points with a focus on one 
pervasive example of the IFIs’ approach to post-war recovery, their 
encouragement of the large-scale extraction and export of natural 
resources. Finally, we show how adopting the work of feminist economists 
who emphasise care, social reproduction and the value of nature, though 
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Although gender and peacebuilding have garnered tremendous amounts of 
feminist attention in recent years, remarkably little of that attention has focused on the 
transnational economic processes and actors that shape post-war economies. This is a 
major oversight. Everything from the day-to-day security of women’s lives, to the 
likelihood of peace agreements’ provisions being implemented and the sustainability of 
peace itself are deeply shaped by, and too often undermined by, the transnational 
economic actors who promulgate post-war economic policies, and the international and 
national actors who carry them out. Therefore, if our aim is to find a path to gender-
equitable, sustainable peace, we need to bring feminist lenses to an analysis of these 
dynamics. In other words: if our concern, as feminists, is with peacebuilding – how to 
repair war’s harms and effect the transformations that enhance human security, reduce 
physical and structural violence, and make long term sustainable peace possible – then 
we must attend to the transnational economic forces that shape the economic, social and 
political conditions of countries emerging from conflict. 
One of the key transnational economic processes shaping post-war countries is 
the entry of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and other donors to design and 
finance the countries’ economic recovery strategy. In this paper, we look at the IFIs’ 
out-size role in determining economic recovery policy, focusing on the International 
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Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB). In particular, we look at one of the 
strategies for economic recovery promoted by the IFIs: the extraction and export of 
natural resources, and we argue that this strategy, like other neoliberal economic 
recovery policies, both a) neglects what is needed to address the destructions, 
disruptions and distortions caused by war, and b) undermines the transformations 
needed for sustainable peace, instead deepening the social and economic inequalities 
that contributed to war in the first place. We draw on post-war economic reconstruction 
in Guatemala, Liberia and Bougainville in Papua New Guinea to illustrate our case that 
this approach to natural resources fails to improve human security and other aspects of 
economic recovery after war, and indeed, tends to deepen inequalities and thus 
undermine sustainable peace.  
We argue that a feminist political economy (FPE) approach is critical for fully 
grasping how it does both those things, for this approach to natural resources – like 
other elements of the IFI’s recipe for post-war recovery – has its roots not just in 
neoliberalism, but in the profoundly gendered neoclassical economic model underlying 
it. Thus, feminist economic perspectives that challenge the gendered assumptions of 
neoclassical economics must become the basis for radically new solutions for post-war 
economic reconstruction. We show how adopting the work of feminist economists and 
ecologists who emphasise care and social reproduction, human rights, and our 
interdependence with nature, though not without its challenges, can offer radically new 
visions for post-war economies, creating conditions which will make peace more 
sustainable.1  
                                                 
1 It should be clear from this introduction that in our Feminist Political Economy approach, 
we employ gender as an analytical tool; it helps us see what is privileged, what is devalued, 
and what is rendered invisible in societies and systems of thought.  
At the same time, because these systems – here, our specific focus is on neoclassical 
economics and neoliberal policies – are built on gendered assumptions, they have differential 
gendered impacts, affecting men, women and other gender categories differently, as groups, 
5 
 
II. Post-War Recovery and IFI Economic Policy: An FPE Critique  
Feminists economists have long drawn attention to the flaws in neoliberal 
policies, such as the extraction and export of natural resources, and the neoclassical 
economics that underpins them (see e.g. UN Women, 2014; UN Women, 2015). But 
they have rarely applied those critiques to post-war recovery. Critical peace and security 
scholars, meanwhile, have also criticized the neoliberal policies of IFIs (see e.g., 
Peterson, 2014; Pugh, 2006), but rarely from a feminist perspective. In this section, we 
analyze some of the main strands of critique of IFI post-war economic recovery policy, 
before laying out our feminist approach.  
Our emphasis is on the IFIs because in most post-war states it is simply not 
possible to grasp the gendered realities of post-war experience, nor, indeed, the contours 
of post-war states themselves, without an understanding of the macro-economic context 
(Jacobson, 2012). And whilst there are many other economic actors in post-war 
contexts, including other lenders and donors, they tend to accept and work within the 
overall macro-economic framework for recovery and development set out by the IFIs 
(True and Svedberg 2018; Woodward 2013). 
In any assessment of IFI policies in post-war countries, it is important to note 
that the IFIs’ approach has not stayed static. Over the post-Cold War period, the World 
Bank and IMF began to show signs of recognition that post-war contexts pose a set of 
distinctive challenges. From the mid-1990s, the Bank began to advocate for more of a 
role for states and institutions in planning and regulating economic policy in order to 
tackle the inequalities which lead to violence (Woodward, 2013, pp. 141–142). This is 
                                                 
even whilst other intersecting inequalities create differential impacts within each of those 
groups.  In this article, our focus is on how they affect women as a group, whilst recognising 
that this is a diverse and contested category, as well as on how they affect other inequalities 
and the prospects for the sustainability of peace.  
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evident in Bank reports such as Breaking the Conflict Trap (Collier et al., 2003), the 
World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development (World Bank 2011), 
and its most recent work on Fragility, Conflict and Violence. Meanwhile, the IMF 
produced a 2011 policy paper conceding that it had been “too bold” and “too 
optimistic” in its prescriptions – its standard macroeconomic adjustments including 
cutting state spending, privatization, and orienting the economy to export – for post-war 
countries in the past (IMF, 2011), and also endorsed a bigger role for governments to 
manage post-war recovery.2  
Despite these efforts to adapt and improve their response to states attempting to 
recover from war, the IFIs’ approach to recovery has continued to be criticised. We can 
identify three strands of literature critical of IFIs in post-war countries. One strand of 
critique focuses on relatively technical issues, such as sequencing and timing, flexibility 
and coordination (see e.g. del Castillo, 2017; Langer & Brown, 2016). In this account, 
the IFIs fail because, despite the shifts in recent years, they have continued to insist on 
implementing neoliberal “development as usual” policies too early, instead of 
postponing them until after efforts to focus on peacebuilding objectives such as 
providing jobs for ex-combatants.  
An overlapping but slightly different strand of the literature criticises the IFIs as 
still, despite the aforementioned shifts, not sufficiently recognising how their policies 
exacerbate the inequalities and violence of the war economy contexts (see e.g. Berdal & 
Wennmann, 2013; Walter, 2015). There is a greater recognition, in this second strand, 
that it just not an issue of timing or co-ordination, but that there may need to be an 
enhanced role for the state in order to ensure the smooth running of the economy. In this 
                                                 
2 These shifts can be seen as part of the move to a “Post-Washington Consensus” (PWC), the 
extent and significance of which, of course, is much contested (Krogstad, 2007; Peterson, 
2014; Pugh, 2006).  
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critique, neoliberal economic policies are seen as sound in general, but further 
institutional reform and strengthening are required to tackle the way profits are subject 
to elite capture and corruption in post-war periods. Neither of these strands question the 
IFIs’ pursuit of economic growth as the goal and measure of post-war economic 
recovery.  
 A third set of scholars argue that it is the neoliberal model of the IFIs itself 
which is the problem (see e.g. Peterson, 2014; Pugh, 2006; Pugh, Cooper, & Turner, 
2008; Woodward, 2013). For these critics, however much the IFIs’ approach to post-
war societies has been modulated in recent years, what remains the same is that the IFIs 
aim to create a state that facilitates private-sector, market-led growth. And the IFIs 
continue to be motivated more by the state’s capacity to service its foreign debt than the 
well-being of its citizens or its ability to enact the social, economic and political 
transformations which are required for peace to be sustainable. The role for the state 
envisioned in the IFIs’ version of “good governance” is “that which is considered 
necessary for markets and the private sector to function and no more” (Woodward, 
2013, p. 144). 
We find much to agree with in the third strand’s critique, but still find it lacking 
in important ways. We agree that the problem is rooted in the IFIs’ continuing 
commitment – despite shifts in rhetoric and modifications to policy and practice – to 
neoliberal views as to what leads to and counts as economic success. We agree with the 
analysis that although the IFIs have shifted to endorse a role for governments and 
government policies for post-war economic recovery, the role they envisage for 
governments remains relatively limited, restricted to ensuring markets operate fairly and 
efficiently (i.e. “good governance”) and to providing safety nets for the most 
marginalized and excluded. And we agree that the shifts have not included any 
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deviation from a commitment to economic growth as the route to poverty reduction, nor 
any questioning of deeper integration into the global capitalist economy as the surest 
formula for economic growth.  
However, we think that integrating a feminist analysis reveals two critical 
insights which are even more fundamental. The first concerns the question of whose 
recovery is being prioritized, or what the “subject” of recovery is. The second looks 
beyond the critique of neoliberalism to explore the way that the IFIs’ neoliberal 
approach to post-war recovery is based on a neoclassical economics, which, as many 
feminist political economists, economists and ecologists have pointed out, is profoundly 
gendered. 
Whose Recovery?  
 
A basic, but critical, feminist move when confronting the social sciences has 
been to ask the deceptively simple question: who, or what, is this theory about? Upon 
whose experience has it been based? A feminist approach to IFI post-war economic 
recovery prescriptions, then, leads us to ask the fundamental question, what does post-
war “economic recovery” mean? To whom or what does it refer? A layperson hearing 
the phrase might start by thinking about recovery from war, and ask what are the 
economic dimensions of that recovery? However, in the way the term is used by 
economists, it means something quite different – the recovery of the economic system, 
or the health of the economy as measured by indicators such as GDP. So how are these 
two meanings different, and why is it important to our discussion?  
An FPE approach, which starts from the perspective of the most-marginalized, 
helps reveal that the economic dimensions of recovery from war are multiple and 
significant.  When we center the day-to-day experiences of people who have survived 
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the war, what economic needs become most salient? First, there is the need to rebuild 
and restore what war too often destroys. Although these needs will always be context 
specific, the rebuilding will likely include needs such as: homes; tools, markets, 
workshops, factories and other means of livelihood; bicycles, carts, cars, buses and 
other forms of mobility; roads, bridges, railways, power grids, schools, hospitals and 
clinics, and more. Restoration needs will likely include not only domestic animals and 
agricultural plots, but the eco-systems that wars disrupt and despoil, and upon which 
communities depend.  
Second, beyond the rebuilding and restoration of what war has destroyed, war 
creates an entirely new set of needs, including: gaps caused by war’s disruption of 
health care and education which need to be remedied; both individuals and families 
dealing with the injuries and traumas of war need systems of care; roads and fields need 
to be de-mined; widow- and child-headed households need new forms of livelihood and 
support, as will people disabled by the violence; and large numbers of people who have 
been displaced need to be resettled.  
Third, there will need to be a transformation from a war economy, in which 
some of a country’s most violent actors control and exploit both licit and illicit goods, to 
a peacetime economy which does not simply continue channelling economic rewards 
into the pockets of violence’s perpetrators.  
Importantly, though, the economic dimensions of recovery from war go beyond 
these repairs to war’s destructions, disruptions and distortions. If peace is to be 
sustainable, recovery also requires the transformation of the inequalities, 
marginalizations and exclusions that underlie and fuel wars (see e.g. Stewart, 2008). 
Not only does this mean that there must be full funding for the implementation of the 
peace agreement’s provisions (e.g., DDR, SSR, land reform, etc.) – something that all 
10 
 
too often does not materialize. But more fundamentally, it means that economic policy 
must be measured against its impact on those pre-existing inequalities – does it deepen 
them, ameliorate them, or even create new ones? In other words, we would argue, the 
economic dimensions of recovery from war include not only tremendous needs for 
repair of the material conditions, structures and physical and social services that make 
people’s lives liveable, but also, and crucially, need for the transformation of the 
economic inequalities that underlie structural violence and war itself.  
This understanding of the economic dimensions of recovery from war is in stark 
contrast to what is typically meant by “post-war economic recovery” as the term is used 
in the international policy community, including by the IFIs. Here, it is neither the 
conditions of people’s lives nor a society’s recovery from war that are centred, but 
rather the recovery of the economic system, or the health of the economy. A healthy 
economic system, for the IFIs, is one where countries are fully integrated into the global 
capitalist economy, with minimal barriers to the profit-maximizing goals of 
transnational corporations and finance.3 
One of the crucial points we make in our critique of the IFIs, then, is this. 
Despite the different purposes of the two institutions, and despite change over time, 
neither the IMF of the World Bank is directly focused on a society’s recovery from war 
or creating the conditions for sustainable peace. The IMF’s remit is to protect the 
stability of the international monetary and financial system. The Bank’s aim of poverty 
reduction suggests a focus on society’s recovery and the conditions for peace, but in 
practice it addresses them only indirectly, in its assumption that economic growth will 
be good for everyone (if institutions are in place to ensure markets are non-corrupt, 
                                                 
3 Notwithstanding the fact that there is a lot more variety of individual belief and motivation 
within the IFIs than blanket accounts of their institutional goals give you. 
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transparent and efficient). And perhaps unsurprisingly, then, the IFIs’ economic 
recovery policies often work against social recovery and peacebuilding, or what we 
refer to as real recovery.   
In other words, we are arguing that what an FPE approach does here is more 
than focus attention on the specific needs of post-war repair and transformation; by 
starting from that ground-up question, it reveals the disjunction (indeed, some might say 
“chasm”) between recovery from war and recovery of the economic system. In so doing, 
it highlights and destabilizes the meaning of “post-war economic recovery” as it is used 
by the IFIs. And it begins to provide the basis for a different conceptualization of 
economic health – where the measure would not be GDP, but the extent to which the 
post-war economic needs outlined above are met. We believe that feminist economists 
alternative approaches provide a fertile source for this reconceptualization, an argument 
we go on to make in our final section below. 
Neoclassical economics and post-war recovery  
The second strand of our argument about the limitations of IFI post-war 
recovery policies, and the second way in which we differ from critical peacebuilding 
scholars such as Peterson, Pugh and Woodward, is that we go beyond the critique of the 
policies’ neoliberalism to explore the way that the IFIs’ approach is based on a 
profoundly gendered neoclassical economics. We argue that the gendered assumptions 
embedded in neoclassical economics are central to explaining how IFI post-war 
economic recovery policy can be so distant from and antithetical to real, society-wide 
recovery from war, and can harm the prospects for sustainable peace.  
Neoclassical economics’ conception of what counts as economic activity, and of 
what should be included in its accountings of how to maximize efficiency and GDP 
growth, are based on a series of exclusions, and those exclusions both draw on and 
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reinforce an extremely distorted representation of economic life (see e.g. Benería, Berik 
& Floro, 2015). At the most fundamental level, it excludes non-market activities. What 
is then not counted in this scheme is caring labour, reproductive labour, subsistence 
labour and other labour outside the formal market economy (see e.g. Folbre, 2001; UN 
Women 2015), as well as the work done by and value of ecosystems (see e.g. Merchant, 
1980; Leach 2015). These are all, somehow, simultaneously devalued, assumed 
nevertheless to always be there, and ignored. The failure in neoclassical economics, 
then, is double: it is a failure to value these forms of activity in and of themselves, but it 
is also, by not attending to them, a failure to understand that they are integral to the 
economic relationships that neoclassical economics does focus on – i.e., a failure to see 
that the formal economy relies on all of them, cannot function without them, and is 
constructed through its relation to them.    
This wildly inaccurate representation of economic life embedded in neoclassical 
economics has several highly problematic impacts when it becomes the basis of 
economic policy. Here we highlight two of them, as they are particularly relevant to the 
challenges of countries recovering from war: the first is that it fails to count, and/or to 
take serious action to avoid, the harms to anything in its exclusion zone, i.e., “non-
market activities.”  And the second is that it then mis-codes potential investment of 
financial resources in real recovery from war as “non-productive,” inefficient, and thus 
unnecessary and undesirable. 
The first issue, well-documented by feminist economists, is that when the 
neoclassical framework ignores or denies that the (part of) the economy it is counting is 
intertwined with and relies on the parts it is ignoring (caring labour, subsistence labour, 
other forms of unpaid work), economic institutions can aim for “structural adjustments” 
in the formal economy without ever noticing the increased burdens that puts on women 
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(who bear so much responsibility for reproductive, caring and subsistence labour) and 
without counting those burdens as economic harms to the women or the economic 
system itself. Hence the extensive feminist literature demonstrating SAPs’ harmful 
impacts on women and other subordinated groups (e.g., Elson, 1991; Çağatay & Özler, 
1995). A related dynamic is at work in relation to neoclassical economics’ exclusion of 
the costs of the environmental degradation, toxic pollution and climate disruption that 
result from the IFIs’ post-war economic recovery policies, including the large-scale 
extraction of natural resources. Corporations are not required to pay these costs, which 
lie outside neoclassical accounting of efficiency and measures such as GDP. And, since 
there is no accounting of the caring, subsistence and provisioning labour done by 
women and poor people, the fact that these environmental costs make their work so 
much more burdensome in the present and far into the future is unremarked, and 
certainly not guarded against. The effect is to deepen gender and other intersectional 
inequalities, thus immiserating large swathes of the population and attenuating the 
prospects for sustainable peace. 
The second issue arising from neoclassical economics’ blindness to the ways 
that the market activity it measures relies on “non-market” activities is that it then mis-
codes potential investment of financial resources in real recovery from war as non-
productive, inefficient, and thus unnecessary and undesirable. That is, because caring, 
subsistence and other forms of non-market activity are not acknowledged as the very 
foundation upon which market activity depends, they do not appear as a sensible or 
necessary place to invest financial resources. So any of the multiple economic needs for 
remedy and repair of war’s harms that we discussed in Section III tend to be seen as 
largely irrelevant to “economic recovery.”  As we’ve seen, there may be recognition 
that a few of those issues need some (typically minimal) attention (such as employment 
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for some ex-combatants) before the real business of economic recovery policy proceeds. 
Or there may be a sense that there should be a minimalist social safety net for the 
poorest of the poor. But because of the assumptive framework of neoclassical 
economics, putting resources into the social infrastructure that could begin to repair 
war’s harms is (mis)understood and accounted for as consumption – not an investment 
in what makes the economy tick (Seguino, 2016).4  
And that, we think, is the crux of it.  The problem is not just a lack of 
government revenue to finance the social infrastructure that could repair war’s damages, 
enhance human security, and support the ecosystems on which human security depends. 
It is that such investment is completely deprioritized, indeed prevented, by policies such 
as the limits the IMF imposes on a country’s public debt relative to GDP (see Seguino, 
2016), which are based on the fundamental misconception of human reproductive, 
caring and subsistence labour, and of nature, as external to the economy, rather than as 
central to the ability of the formal economy to function.  
 
III. Natural Resource Extraction, and Guatemala, Liberia and Bougainville 
This section illustrates our arguments by examining one common element of the 
IFIs’ approach to post-war economic reconstruction – the promotion of large-scale 
extraction and export of natural resources – in three post-war countries. Our aim is to 
demonstrate the particular insights an FPE approach provides.   
The IFIs promote the large-scale extraction and export of natural resources 
because it is an obvious means of economic growth and a way to bring in foreign 
                                                 
4 Seguino (2016) discusses this point in relation to the question of how the Sustainable 
Development Goals may be financed, (not the financing of post-war recovery), but we think 
her arguments have much to offer for post-war contexts, as we go on to discus in section V. 
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currency which will enable the country to service its debt. This suits the extractive 
industries, for whom post-war countries are often attractive targets, the last frontier—in 
contrast to countries not affected by war, where rights to oil, gas, minerals, and other 
resources have already been largely allocated (see e.g. Bruch, Muffett, & Nichols, 2016; 
Klare, 2012; Pugh et al., 2008). From the perspective of the countries themselves, 
having a wealth of natural resources which can be extracted, however, is rather more 
complicated, especially since, in many cases, the wealth generated by those resources 
has both fuelled and funded decades of war.5 Despite this troubled past, the IFIs, 
committed to their faith that good governance will prevent a repeat of history, prescribe 
large-scale extraction for export as a key plan of the economic growth they believe to be 
the route to, and representative of, recovery. 
Guatemala, Liberia and Bougainville are three very different post-war settings, 
from three continents, with different histories, geographies and cultures, and with 
different war trajectories. As Guatemala’s Peace Accord was signed in 1996, 
Bougainville’s in 2001, and Liberia’s in 2003, sufficient time has elapsed since the 
signing of the peace agreement to enable us to assess the impacts of IFI’s prescriptions 
for post-war recovery and specifically their focus on the large-scale extraction and 
export of natural resources – extractivism – across these very different locales.  
In the case of Guatemala, the country’s orientation to extraction and export had 
begun before the war ended, but the peace accords offered the opportunity for IFIs and 
domestic elites to speed up the process (see e.g. Jonas, 2000; Robinson, 2000; Short, 
2007). With World Bank blessings and support, Guatemala immediately reformed and 
                                                 
5 The so-called “resource curse,” in both war-torn and post-war countries, has now been the 
subject of a considerable literature (for overviews see e.g. Benner & Oliviera, 2013; Bruch et 
al., 2016; Lujala, Rustad, & Kettenmann, 2016). 
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rehabilitated national laws that facilitated large-scale mining, primarily in gold and 
nickel (see e.g. Dearden, 2012; Granovsky-Larsen, 2017; Hale, 2011). 
Liberia also had an extractives industry before the end of the war, but despite the 
fact it had contributed to the conflict (Sawyer, 2005), the IFIs encouraged revitalization 
of the natural resources sector as a central plank of Liberia’s post-war economic 
recovery strategy. Liberia’s post-war Poverty Reduction Strategy, designed by the 
World Bank in partnership with the Liberian government, prioritized opening up the 
country to foreign investment, mostly to be channeled into palm oil, forestry, rubber and 
iron-ore, which would be extracted for export (see Paczynska, 2016, p. 298; O’Mahony, 
2019).  
In Bougainville, as in Liberia, extraction of natural resources had played a key 
part in causing war. Indeed, the Panguna mine, once the largest copper mine in the 
world, triggered a decade-long civil war and left physical, environmental and 
psychological scars across Bougainville. Customary landowners, aggrieved by the 
mining operation’s serious social and environmental impacts, organized a campaign of 
industrial sabotage that led to Panguna’s closure in 1989, and large-scale mining has 
been banned from Bougainville for the last 30 years (Adamo, 2018; Ginnivan, 2016). 
Despite this history, the IFIs have promoted mining as a key part of Bougainville’s 
economic development: the World Bank’s 2007 Country Assistance Strategy for Papua 
New Guinea, of which the autonomous region of Bougainville is a part, states, for 
example, “With the Bougainville Peace Accord and the establishment of the 
Autonomous Government of Bougainville, Bougainville could again become a prime 
destination for mineral exploration.”  
17 
 
Natural Resource extraction as a route to recovery from war’s harms? 
When we look at these cases to assess the impact of the extraction and export of 
natural resources on the prospects for social recovery and the repair of war’s harms, 
three main issues stand out. First, this strategy is simply not oriented toward or designed 
to meet post-war countries’ post-war needs of social and physical repair or to improve 
the physical and economic security for the nation’s citizens; that is not its goal. Second, 
to the extent that the extraction and export of natural resources is promoted as meeting 
any of the country’s specific war-recovery needs (such as providing employment or 
government revenue), it tends to under-deliver on those promises. And third, when it 
comes to human security, extractivist policies often make things worse, not better.   
Regarding the first: it is worth highlighting again the basic fact that extractivism 
and other elements of neoliberal approaches (such as agricultural policy that prioritizes 
production for export) are simply not oriented toward or designed to meet those post-
war needs of social and physical repair or to improve the physical and economic 
security for the nation’s citizens – that is not their main purpose. Instead, they aim to 
“strengthen the economy” by making the country as attractive as possible to global 
corporate finance – to be accomplished through, inter alia, making sure there is little in 
the way of labor or environmental protections, few barriers to foreigners amassing huge 
tracts of land or taking ownership of national natural resources, and making sure the 
state prioritizes using its revenue to pay international lenders the interest on its (often 
inherited, odious) debt. However much the neoliberal assumption is that economic 
growth will trickle down and be good for all, the reality is that heavily-indebted post-
war states, if they are being pressed to service their debt, are unlikely to be able to 
invest in the remedy and repair of war’s damages.   
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Regarding the second point: to the extent that extractivism is promoted as 
meeting any of the country’s specific real war-recovery needs (versus simply just 
growth of the economy), it tends to under-deliver on those promises. The two main war-
recovery benefits extractivism promises are increased revenue to the state via both 
royalties and taxation, and jobs. The promised increase in revenue is undercut, however, 
by the IFIs’ prescriptions for how to attract foreign corporations in the first place. In 
Guatemala, for example, World Bank-approved “reforms” that facilitated large-scale 
mining included corporate tax exemptions and a reduction in the royalties rate from 6% 
to 1% (Dearden, 2012, p. 15) thus depriving the Guatemalan government of significant 
revenue much needed for development. In 2004, the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) (the branch of the World Bank that lends to private companies), gave $45 million 
support to Goldcorp for work on the Marlin gold mine, claiming that the mine’s “taxes 
and royalties would equal 7 per cent of the government’s annual tax revenue” (Dearden, 
2012). The reality has been very different. In 2007, for example, royalties and taxes 
from the Marlin mine amounted to nearer 0.3 per cent of total government revenue 
(Dearden, 2012; also see Zarsky & Stanley, 2013, p. 138). Guatemala is thus capturing a 
relatively small share of total mine revenues and earnings of the highly lucrative mine.  
In Liberia, the IFIs argued natural resource extraction would provide the 
government with tax revenue that it could utilise to improve public services, estimating 
that the royalties and corporate taxes generated by concessionary deals with foreign 
investors could bring in two billion dollars over ten years (IMF, 2010, p. 14). The 
World Bank and other donors concerned about Liberia’s past experience with extraction 
and export of natural resources launched the Governance and Economic Management 
Assistance Programme (GEMAP) to try and ensure wealth stayed in the country and 
was more evenly shared (see Benner & Oliviera, 2013). Despite GEMAP, and despite 
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foreign direct investment (FDI) flowing in considerable amounts, however, firms have 
avoided paying their full tax and royalties obligations (see Paczynska, 2016, p. 305; 
Global Witness 2017; Watkins, 2013, p. 63).  
Given the sensitivities around mining in Bougainville, the IFIs consistently state 
the importance of good governance for the sector. Yet, to develop Bougainville’s long-
term mining policy and law, the World Bank appointed Adam Smith International 
(ASI), a UK-based neoliberal consultancy firm, to assist in drafting the Mining Act and 
regulations. Unsurprisingly, the resultant law seems designed to put corporate interests 
above local (Ginnivan, 2016; Provost, 2016; Fletcher & Prince, 2018).  
As for the promise of jobs, the record has been little better. Although we will 
discuss jobs at more length in the next section, here we will just note that in Liberia, one 
of the key rationales for encouraging FDI was the promise of new employment 
opportunities and improved living standards. Neither objective was accomplished, even 
before the Ebola crisis exacerbated the situation. Secure, well-paying jobs have not 
materialized (Beevers, 2016; Paczynska, 2016; O’Mahony, 2019). Many are employed 
on the basis of the Sime Darby concession: on short term, three-month contracts that do 
not include health benefits, on salaries of three US dollars per day (Paczynska 2016, 
p.310). The same story of failure to deliver on jobs or raising living standards can be 
seen in relation to extractives in Guatemala (see Deonandan & Ortiz Loaiza, 2016). 
Meanwhile, there is little to suggest that the Panguna mine, if reopened, will provide 
sufficient jobs to enable societal recovery from war, especially given the more 
mechanized mines of today.6 
                                                 
6 Modern mechanized mining tends not to require a big labor force, and mining corporations 
often employ international staff with the requisite training on a fly-in fly-out basis rather 
than train and employ local staff. 
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Regarding the third point – that on many dimensions of recovery from war and 
the need to create more secure lives for a post-war country’s citizens, extractive 
enterprises frequently makes things much worse – there are a plethora of dimensions in 
which this is true. Because space does not allow addressing all of them, here we will 
look only at land and livelihoods, health, and physical and sexual violence.  
There is no human security without livelihoods – the means of securing the 
necessities of life. And as those means are often destroyed in war, reconstructing 
livelihoods, whether they are subsistence livelihoods linked to the land, or livelihoods in 
the form of paid employment, is a crucial part of recovering from war. But development 
of extractive industries frequently has disastrous effects on subsistence livelihoods, 
affecting women, the rural poor and indigenous communities disproportionally. A 
central problem is that extractivism is a model that is imposed largely through land 
dispossession. This has undermined women’s, especially indigenous women’s, 
livelihoods and food security in many parts of Guatemala as they have lost the small 
family plots on which they produce the corn and beans they require to survive (Méndez 
Gutiérrez & Carrera Guerra, 2015; also see Hale, 2011).  
Mining (along with the expansion of biofuel production) has eliminated the 
option of renting land, and also eliminated access to the mountains, where food has 
been traditionally gathered or hunted (Méndez Gutiérrez & Carrera Guerra, 2015). This 
undermines food security, and makes life particularly challenging for those who are 
assigned the task of providing food for families and communities – predominantly 
women. 
In Liberia, as in Guatemala, the invitation to foreign-owned corporations to 
extract the country’s natural resources has resulted in significant land-dispossession for 
ordinary people (see The Rights and Resources Group, 2013; O’Mahony, 2019). Forty 
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per cent of the country’s total area is now covered by concessionary agreements (World 
Bank, 2018). This extensive land-grabbing has been facilitated by an approach that 
classifies land without visible development as ‘idle and useless’, and deems it available 
for concessionary agreements (Buntzel & Topor, 2013, p. 27). This is a breath-taking 
instantiation of the neoclassical economics blinders that feminist economists and 
ecologists have described. When all it counts as being part of the economy are forms of 
production that are paid and add goods and services to the GDP, neoclassical economics 
wilfully fails to perceive and acknowledge that “idle” land, and the ecological systems it 
supports, is actually active and useful. And it equally fails to perceive and acknowledge 
all of the ways that land is actively being used – for the informal, unpaid, and 
subsistence forms of economic activity, often undertaken by women, which are central 
to household livelihoods and community survival and identity. Such land-grabbing 
means water resources for fishing, forests for hunting and gathering herbs, and marshes 
for rice growing are claimed from local people (Buntzel & Topor, 2013), undermining 
food security, already at crisis levels due to the war (Paczynska, 2016, p. 304), and 
increasing women’s burdens. The recently adopted Land Rights Act (2018) may restrict 
future land grabbing, but Liberia’s experience indicates that provisions on paper are not 
always followed in practice (Paczynska, 2016; Brownwell, 2019; O’Mahony, 2019).7 In 
Bougainville, the formal legal power of dispossession is more overt. Observers of the 
new ASI-designed mining legislation contend that it gives Bougainville’s government 
the power to confiscate customary land, with those who resist facing stiff custodial 
penalties, provisions which nullify constitutional and common law protections (Jubilee 
Australia Research Centre, 2015; Lasslett, 2015). 
                                                 
7 The law also cannot be applied retro-actively, and so cannot help those who have already 
been dispossessed (see O’Mahony 2019). 
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Extractive industries imperil food security not only through land dispossession, 
but also through despoiling and fouling the physical environment. In Guatemala, for 
example, at the Fenix nickel project, indigenous communities in the municipality of El 
Estor allege that land productivity and thus food availability has decreased due to 
airborne emissions from the mine (Deonandan, Tatham, & Field, 2017, p. 408). Local 
water supplies, too, have been reduced by overuse, or contaminated by the toxic 
chemicals used to extract minerals, causing health problems8 and generating additional 
burdens on those responsible for finding clean water sources for drinking, cooking and 
cleaning – again, predominantly women (Deonandan et al., 2017, p. 408). At the Marlin 
gold mine, in the west Highlands of the country, about 47% of households near the mine 
depend on ground and river water for drinking, as well as crop irrigation and watering 
livestock. They are thus particularly vulnerable to exposure to cyanide and acid mine 
drainage from heavy metals (Zarsky & Stanley, 2013, p. 142). 
In Liberia, as in Guatemala, the environmental impacts of extractivism are often 
severe, and further exacerbate the challenge for women to provide for their families, and 
maintain their own and their children’s health (see e.g. Paczynska, 2016, p. 309).  
Meanwhile, income-generating opportunities that have traditionally existed have been 
undermined. In many concessionary areas, farmers are only allowed to grow food for 
family consumption and not permitted to sell the produce thus further limiting 
communities’ ability to ensure food security. In the palm oil concession areas, 
communities have also been prevented from growing and selling wild palms, 
traditionally an important source of income generated by women (UN Women Liberia, 
2014).  
                                                 
8 Specific illnesses mentioned to be plaguing community members, as a result of effluent 
from the mine’s refinery polluting Lake Izabal, a major source of the area’s water supply, 
were said to be hair loss, rashes, and gastrointestinal problems, all occurring more frequently 
for children (see Deonandan et al., 2017, p. 208). 
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Equally disturbingly, extractive industries are often antithetical to human 
security at the most basic level of physical violence, including sexual violence. Just as 
armed groups often employ sexual violence as a way to get communities to flee and 
yield their land, extractive industries have used it for the same purpose. In Guatemala, 
for example, thirty years after Indigenous Mayan women were the victims of sexual 
violence at the hands of the Guatemalan military during the civil war, women in those 
same communities were again the victims of sexual violence, this time at the behest of 
the Guatemala Nickel Company, a subsidiary of Canadian Hudbay Mining, in order to 
undermine resistance to the mine (Méndez Gutiérrez & Carrera Guerra, 2015). In 
Liberia, people protesting the expansion of Golden Veroleum (GVL), a palm oil 
company, are reported to have been violently beaten, threatened and arrested (Global 
Witness, 2015; Brownell, 2019; O’Mahony, 2019). And, in Bougainville, those living 
nearest Panguna mine fear renewed violence if they resist (Jubilee Australia Research 
Centre, 2014).  
Natural Resource Extraction as a route to address the inequalities underlying 
war? 
Recovery from war requires not only the repair of the material conditions, 
structures and physical and social services that make people’s lives liveable, but also the 
transformation of the economic inequalities that underlie structural violence and war 
itself. Extractivism, however, tends to deepen inequalities and even create new ones, 
whether by denying the state the revenue it needs to invest in the services and social 
infrastructure which would bring equality; failing to provide decent jobs for few but a 
small minority; exacerbating the burdens of those charged with care and social 
reproduction; or undermining land reform and other efforts to distribute a state’s 
resources more equitably.  
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The accounts above made clear the way in which the IFI-promoted legislation 
around extractive industries robbed the Guatemalan and Liberian governments of 
considerable revenue, and how plans for Bougainville risk doing the same, despite IFI 
rhetoric about the importance of good governance. What the IFI approach misses is the 
sense in which the repatriation of the majority of the wealth produced by foreign 
corporations’ exploitation of extractives is inevitable, even in best case scenarios of 
good governance; it has to be or corporations could not be induced to invest. Whilst this 
dynamic makes extractivism a disastrous strategy in many countries in the global south, 
it is particularly harmful in post-war contexts, where inequalities are urgently in need of 
transformation if a return to war, with its intensification of insecurities, is to be avoided. 
The missing wealth undermines post-war governments’ abilities to invest in that which 
could address inequalities, including universal, free, quality education and healthcare, 
childcare, social care for the elderly and people with disabilities, and a transformative 
justice system.  
Regarding jobs, the issues are not only that extractives provide very few decent 
jobs, and that the jobs are often short-term, as described above, but also that they 
privilege certain groups in the allocation of those jobs. When the mine was in operation 
in Bougainville, it prompted the rise of a relatively wealthy local elite who monopolised 
political and economic opportunities (Regan & Griffin, 2005). Frustration with the way 
that the mine’s benefits were so unequally shared contributed in large part to the ten-
year war. Likewise, large scale logging and agribusiness in Liberia is alleged to have 
largely recreated the arrangements that fostered corruption and patronage and exploited 
forest communities (see e.g. Beevers, 2016, p. 321).  
The employment opportunities provided by extractivism not only reinforce 
inequalities that fuel communal violence, they can also exacerbate gender inequalities 
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which, whilst not directly contributing to reigniting conflict, contribute to violence in its 
broader sense. In Guatemala, mining employment opportunities have been 
predominantly open only to men, deepening women’s economic dependence on men, 
and driving a rise in drinking, prostitution, and other disruptions to family life 
(Deonandan et al., 2017, p. 410). A similar account emerges of Bougainville’s mining 
experience (Jubilee Australia Research Centre, 2014; Hill & Fletcher, 2018), and 
indeed, from most areas of the world where large-scale mining operates (Eftimie, 
Heller, & Strongman, 2009).  
But the deepening of inequalities through extractive production is not limited to 
the effects of their employment practices. They too often exacerbate the poverty of the 
already-poor by undermining the livelihoods women and indigenous people once had, 
whether in artisanal and small-scale mining, in fishing or subsistence agriculture, or in 
income generating activities such marketing grown or gathered produce (e.g., as with 
Liberian growers and sellers of wild palms). Food security and health are further 
compromised by the ways extractives undermine the quality of the land, as outlined 
above. This deepens inequalities as it is the poor and marginalized who suffer most 
from depleted and degraded physical environments, especially those who are charged 
with care, social reproduction, and provisioning for their families.  
Extractivism also undermines processes which are often initiated at war’s end to 
address inequalities, such as land reform, justice and reconciliation programmes, and 
security sector reform. In Liberia, for example, the granting of long-term concessions to 
transnational extractive corporations may render the Land Rights Act impotent (see e.g. 
O’Mahony, 2019).  
This section has, perforce, been but a brief look at one of the common elements 
of IFI post-war economic recovery prescriptions – the large scale, privatized, FDI-led 
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extraction of natural resources for export. Looking at how this approach has played out 
in three post-war contexts well-illustrates, we think, our two key points. First, it shows 
not only the disjuncture between IFI post-war economic recovery policy and real 
recovery from war, but also how the former actually frequently undermines the latter, as 
it too often leads to land dispossession, the undermining of livelihoods, physical 
violence, the despoiling of the environment, with concomitant effects on people’s health 
and increasing burdens of care, and the deepening of inequalities. Second, we’ve argued 
that the failure of IFI post-war economic recovery policy to address the needs for real 
recovery from war is rooted not only in its neoliberalism, but deeper, in neoclassical 
assumptions about what the economy is for and its silences about care and nature. A 
feminist political economy approach, attentive to those who are most-marginalised, to 
all forms of violence, and to the gendered assumptions at the core of mainstream 
political and economic thought, is required to see the source of the shortcomings. 
Fortunately, it also generates the solutions.  
IV. Feminist Alternatives for Post-War Recovery 
 Feminist scholarship outlining alternatives to extractivism, and to neoliberal 
policies more generally, is vast and extraordinarily rich (see e.g. Balakrishnan, Heintz, 
& Elson, 2016; Bauhardt & Harcourt, 2018; Leach, 2015; Raworth, 2017). It is thus 
somewhat surprising that there have not been more attempts to apply the insights of 
feminist economists and ecologists to the specific context of post-war recovery. For, as 
much as post-war contexts present significant challenges, as outlined in our earlier 
discussion of what is required for real recovery, they also offer “windows of 
opportunity” (Rees & Chinkin, 2015). For while post-war needs for remedy, repair and 
transformation are great, the period immediately following a war’s political settlement 
is also a moment of great potential: large amounts of external support flow in; 
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constitutions are drafted, infrastructure is (re)built; economic plans are drawn up; and 
the social, political and economic arrangements that will structure the post-war society 
are being set. The UN has recognised this to some extent with its advocacy of “building 
back better.” We argue here for something much more transformative than the UN has 
in mind with this slogan, however, drawing on some of the central ideas of feminist 
economic and ecological thought to suggest alternatives for post-war economic 
recovery that could create a gender-equitable, sustainable peace. We structure this 
section around two of the key insights of feminist economic and ecological thought, in 
order to demonstrate the ways in which the starting points are radically different from 
those of the IFIs. We can only hope to give indicative suggestions here, given both the 
breadth of feminist thought which means we cannot cover everything, and the 
marginalised position of such thought, which means that we have few concrete 
examples upon which to draw. Nonetheless, we hope to make clear the potential 
feminist thought has for doing economic recovery differently.  
If we return, for example, to one key insight of feminist economics – that unpaid 
work is as important as paid work in determining the well-being not only of individuals 
and families, but also of the economy itself – how might that insight transform the 
priorities of post-war economic recovery policy?   
The benefits of an approach to post-war economies that privileges care – and the 
infrastructure to support it – are obvious given the widespread needs outlined in Section 
II. Providing state-funded care for the injured and disabled – and for children and the 
elderly – would improve the lives of men and women, war-wounded and their care-
givers alike, provide jobs, would enable those with dependents to combine their caring 
roles with paid employment; and would help societies recover from the impacts of 
widespread violence. Investing in education, in health, in the justice system – a 
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transformative social infrastructure – would rebuild lives damaged by war and address 
the inequalities underlying war. Such investments in Guatemala, Liberia and 
Bougainville could have produced a new social contract, which could in turn have 
enhanced the legitimacy of the post-war state, contributing to the sustainability of the 
peace.  
And, if we return to one key insight of feminist ecologists – that natural 
resources, like unpaid labour, also need to be revalued, to be seen as part of an 
ecosystem upon which humans depend – how might that insight similarly transform the 
priorities of post-war economic recovery policy? 
It would mean a turn away from the large-scale extraction and export of natural 
resources, especially fossil fuels. Instead, feminist alternatives could include renewable 
energy programmes, structural transformations to everything from transport to food 
production and distribution, and massive reforestation9 – a move from extraction to 
restoration, regeneration and replenishment. Many post-war countries in poorest regions 
of the world have comparative advantages in renewable energy and have the 
opportunity to leapfrog to climate-friendly urbanization and transport strategies (Klasen, 
2013; UN Women, 2014). If attention to justice and equality are built-in (which does 
not always happen with ‘green economy’ proposals but which are central to feminist 
ecological thinking (see Nelson 2009; Leach, 2015, Raworth 2017; UN Women, 2014)), 
reforestation, renewable energy and sustainable agriculture could provide plentiful 
employment and livelihood opportunities, vital for addressing gender inequalities and 
the inequalities underlying war. There might be extraction of natural resources in that 
feminist future, but it would likely be of a radically different model, involving small-
scale extractive activities driven by local and regional interests and demands; inclusive 
                                                 
9 Building on Wangari Mathai’s inspirational GreenBelt Movement 
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of community and women’s rights of participation, control, and ownership; and which 
supports societies to organise work on a collective, shared and equitable basis, such as 
that proposed by the Mining Working Group at the UN (Mining Working Group at the 
UN, 2014).10  
The massive physical infrastructure projects created in order to facilitate the 
efficient export of extracted goods, currently prioritised by IFIs and post-war 
governments, would be replaced by the social infrastructure designed to support care, 
well-being and harmony with nature. Corridors of extraction, in other words, would be 
replaced by webs of provisioning. Feminist-inspired models would not use GDP growth 
or repayment of debts as a measure of whether a post-war country is recovering. Rather, 
the measures would relate to real recovery from war, whether the percentage of people 
receiving the care and the food they need, or the number of trees being planted or rivers 
running free of pollution.  
Feminist economists and ecologists draw attention to a range of mechanisms 
through which such a transformation could be financed. Aid transfers to post-war 
countries are significant but currently – due to IMF rules – restrictions apply which 
preclude post-war governments from spending it to support an infrastructure of care; 
this could be changed. If investment in social infrastructure was classified as 
“investment” rather than “consumption,” so as to recognise its “public goods quality,” 
post-war states could invest more freely without infringing IMF limits on public debt 
(see Seguino, 2016; UN Women, 2015). More resources for an infrastructure of care 
would also be available if donors decided to forgive odious debts, an appropriate action 
especially because those debts were often racked up by the corrupt regime a war was 
                                                 
10 Of course, any move away from extractivism also requires tackling cultures of 
consumerism, built-in obsolescence in technological goods, and other harmful ecological 
practices, which are situated predominantly in the global north. 
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fought to overthrow. Transforming taxation practices offers multiple opportunities: 
controls could be applied to cross border short term capital flows (e.g. Financial 
Transaction Tax); tax loopholes could be closed and more progressive tax regimes 
enacted (corporate tax dodging costs poor countries at least $100 billion every year (see 
Oxfam, 2019); Redirecting just a fraction of the resources spent on militaries and 
military equipment, some $1.7 trillion in 2018 (SIPRI, 2018), to post-war countries 
would enable significant investment in the transition from extractivism to an economy 
of restoration and care (WILPF, 2018). 
Not only is the financing possible if the international community had the will to 
do it and were willing to throw off their neoclassical blinders: there is also basis in law 
for adopting feminist economists’ proposals, as many feminists point out (Chinkin & 
Kaldor, 2017; Rees and Chinkin 2015). The International Covenant of Economic and 
Social Rights puts obligations on states and, potentially, the IFIs themselves, to meet the 
economic and social rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948, including the right to work, the right to leisure, the right to a decent standard of 
living and the right to an education. In fact, they are not only obligated to meet these 
rights, but to use “the maximum of their available resources” with a view to 
“progressively achieving the full realization of economic, social and cultural rights”  
Although space does not permit exploration of additional elements of feminist 
economic and ecological thought, we hope the above examples demonstrate that it 
opens a rich vein of possibilities for developing post-war economic recovery policy that 
supports real recovery and peace that is more sustainable.11  
                                                 




Applying the insights of feminist economists to post-war economic recovery 
would not be without major challenges, of course. Among others -- they assume a 
strong role for the state to create, support and finance an infrastructure of care, uphold 
social and economic rights, and regulate environmental impacts, but in post-war 
settings, states are often weak, fragmented and beset by corruption. While the IFIs have 
partly recognised this with their push for good governance, we are arguing that good 
governance means far more than providing a stable environment for markets; it should 
mean an active, interventionist state that puts care and environmental principles at its 
heart. How you get from states which have been weakened by decades of structural 
adjustment policies, austerity measures and warfare, and which privilege patriarchal 
patronage relations over public services, to stronger states which prioritize social 
provisioning and environmentally sustainable forms of development presents a 
considerable challenge, for sure, and full treatment of it would require its own article, 
but we would suggest that it is a challenge that feminists must take on.  
 
V. Conclusion 
In this article, we have used an FPE approach to show how the IFIs’ approach to 
post-war economic recovery undermines prospects for a gender-equitable, sustainable 
peace. We have focused on just one strand of the IFIs’ approach – an encouragement of 
large-scale extraction and export of natural resources – in order to demonstrate the 
flaws. We have argued that even if the IFIs’ attempts to instate “good governance” were 
successful, extractivism would not facilitate a gender-equitable sustainable peace. This 
is because extractivism – along with other strands of the IFIs’ approach such as their 
emphasis on privatization, their insistence on fiscal balancing, and their encouragement 
of private investment in massive infrastructure projects – is geared towards recovery of 
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the economic system, and not real recovery from war. A key to understanding how the 
two can be so different, how economic recovery policy can be antithetical to the needs 
of a war-damaged society, can be found, we have argued, in the gendered assumptive 
framework of neoclassical economics. As such, feminist economic thinking which 
denaturalizes those assumptions and offers alternative visions of the functioning and 
purpose of an economy must become an integral part of our imaginings of how it is 
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